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Abstract
In the spirit of Hanson (1997), we analyze the existence of regional nominal wage
gradients in Spain during the interwar period (1914-1930) and their transformation fol-
lowing an important change in trade policy. However, our case study analyzes the e¤ects
of the substitution of an open economy by a closed one - exactly the reverse of the process
studied by Hanson. We nd strong evidence of the existence of a regional wage gradient
centered on Barcelona, which weakened after 1922. In Spain during the interwar period
protectionist policies appear to have favored the loss of centrality of the coastal location
(Barcelona) and the relative rise of other locations.
1 Introduction
Recent decades have seen a revival of the interest in economic geography. Globalization and
the appearance of regional blocks have contributed to this resurgence by intensifying the fear
of radical changes in the localization of economic activities. The New Economic Geography
has tried to explain which locations attract most rms and what are the mechanisms that
make these locations attractive.1 One of these mechanisms is an externality demand, the
market access e¤ect, which predicts the concentration of economic activity in the regions
with higher market potential. In this setting, trade liberalisation by changing the market po-
tential of the regions, has an impact on the location of economic activities within countries.
However, theorists have not yet reached a consensus on whether international trade liberal-
ization increases the concentration of economic activities within a given country or whether
gradual dispersion is observed as the country progressively opens up to trade (See Krugman
1See Fujita et al. (1999) for a formalization of the di¤erent possible agglomeration forces that give rise to
industrial centers and Head and Mayer (2004) for a survey of the empirics of economic geography.
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and Livas, 1996; Monfort and Nicolini, 2000; Paluzie, 2001; Behrens et al., 2006; and Behrens
et al., 2007 for a theoretical discussion on this issue). As for the location of industrial centers
in a domestic market, and more particularly the location choice between border and interior
regions, trade liberalization has two counteracting e¤ects: increased market access (which is
favorable to export production) and increased import competition (which is negative for do-
mestic rms that compete with foreign producers). Depending on which of these two e¤ects
dominates, border regions will be favored or hampered by trade liberalization (See Crozet
and Koenig-Soubeyran, 2004 and Brülhart, Crozet and Koenig, 2004).
In this paper we will contribute to solve this indeterminancy trough the analysis of the
relationship between wages and market access across provinces in Spain. We will also test
whether the di¤erent e¤ects of trade policy on border and interior regions played an important
role in the evolution of regional inequalities.
In the New Economic Geography models, such as Krugman (1991)s seminal paper, an
important prediction can be derived from the equilibrium condition of prot equalization
between regions: that of the existence of regional wage inequalities. In Krugmans model,
rms can a¤ord to pay higher wages if they have good access to the larger market. The
nominal wage in a region tends to be higher if incomes in other regions with low transport
costs from this region are high. Hence, the wage equation in the model exhibits a kind of
demand linkage or backward linkage: in the regions with higher proportions of industry,
wages are higher; this in turn attracts more workers, and so income and expenditure increase
further in these regions. In equilibrium, di¤erences in nominal wages persist between the
di¤erent regions. Higher nominal wages act as a counterbalance to the better market access
of central regions. They reect the existence of agglomeration externalities.
Hanson (2005) pioneered a structural estimation of the wage equation present in the
majority of economic geography models.2 However, non-structural methods can also be useful
to analyze the relationship between market access and factor prices. For instance, a trade
liberalization process may change the attractiveness of di¤erent locations inside a country as
the importance of foreign markets to domestic producers rises. Border regions may be favored
while central regions are hampered. Hanson (1997) uses trade liberalization in Mexico as a
natural laboratory to test for these e¤ects. For the period 1965-1988, he estimates a regional
wage gradient, with nominal wages decreasing with transport costs from industrial centers.
He shows that distance to industrial centers (Mexico City and the U.S.-Mexico border) has a
negative inuence on relative wages. Moreover, according to his hypothesis, the transition to
2Redding and Venables (2004) and Amiti and Cameron (2007) are other examples of this kind of structural
approach to the consideration of wage inequalities.
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an open economy should lead to a compression of regional wage di¤erentials and a weakening
in the gradient to the capital as rms relocate from Mexico City to the U.S. border. The
evidence for these expected changes is weaker. He nds no evidence of a structural break in
the relationship between distance and relative regional wages following trade reform, or of a
decrease in the e¤ect of distance from the capital.
Can the Spanish experience in the interwar period provide new evidence in this respect?
The second half of the 19th century was dominated by the rise of Barcelona (a province
located in a region, Catalonia, bordering France) as the countrys main center of industrial
production. In those years, Barcelona came to concentrate a third of Spanish industrial
output. However, the turn of the century marked a halt in this process as Madrid began to
increase its share of Spanish manufacturing, gradually closing the gap vis-à-vis the Catalan
city.
At that time, the reaction to the loss of Spains remaining colonies put an end to the
liberal regime which had been characterized by a relative trade openness, and implanted
a protectionist model of development with harsh restrictions on the international trade of
goods, semi-manufactures and raw materials. This protectionist turn was intensied in the
interwar years with a further increase in tari¤s in 1922.
In the spirit of Hanson (1997), we analyze the existence of regional nominal wage gra-
dients in Spain during the interwar period (1914-1930) and their transformation following
an important change in trade policy. However, our case study analyzes the e¤ects of the
substitution of an open economy by a closed one - exactly the reverse of the processes stud-
ied by Hanson. First, we nd strong evidence for the existence of a regional wage gradient
centered on Barcelona. Second, even though the trade shift we study is more gradual than
the one analyzed by Hanson, we nd strong evidence of the weakening of the gradient after
the intensication of the protectionist turn in 1922.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical predictions for
regional wages. Section 3 describes the evidence on the patterns of trade policy, industry
location and regional wages in Spain. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis and discusses
the results obtained. In the last section, we give the main conclusions and suggest some
directions for further research.
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2 Theoretical predictions
2.1 Industry agglomeration and regional wage gradients
In the New Economic Geography, industrial agglomeration is presented as the result of de-
mand and cost linkages between rms, created by the interaction between transport costs
and xed costs of production. One of these linkages, known as backward or demand linkage,
forecasts that rms will be prepared to pay higher salaries in those regions that are closest to
the main markets of consumption and production, since these regions enjoy lower transport
costs. Hence, this demand linkage predicts the existence of regional wage gradients, with
nominal wages decreasing with transport costs from industrial centers, and their possible
reversal following changes in trade regimes.
To guide our analysis let us use the Spanish economy before WWI as an example. Which
markets predominated in Spain at that time? Barcelona was the industrial center of the
country, while the capital city of the country, Madrid, was an important source of demand.3 In
contrast, external markets - that is, the former colonies and Europe- were never an important
destination for Spanish industrial output. Altogether they absorbed less than 10% of Spanish
total production.4 Nevertheless, foreign markets were important as a source of raw materials
and intermediate goods required in the production of Barcelonas main industrial sectors, i.e.
the consumer industries (textile and metallurgy).
The predictions of the model for regional relative wages can be summarized in the following
reduced-form equation:
wi
wc
= F (xi; x

i ) (1)
where wi is the nominal wage in location i, wc is the nominal wage in the industry center
(Barcelona), xi is unit transport costs from location i to the industry center, and xi is unit
transport cost from location i to the capital city (Madrid). The function F is conditional on
location c being the industry center.
It holds that
wc  wi; i 6= c; (2)
3 In 1913, Madrids industrial output relative to Barcelona was 40%.
4 In 1913, exports of manufacturing goods accounted for 25% of total exports. Considering that exports
were less than 10% of GDP and that industrial output was around 25% of Spanish GDP, we can conclude
that external markets absorbed less than 10% of Spanish industrial output.
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and,
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@xi
< 0 (4)
Hence the hypothesis is that there is a regional wage gradient centered in Barcelona and
that regional relative wages may also reect transport costs to the capital city, Madrid. In this
context, suppose there is a protectionist turn in trade policy. Trade protection reduces the
attraction of the domestic industry center located at the border, Barcelona. To improve their
access to the domestic market, rms may relocate to other central locations, in particular the
capital city, Madrid. Nominal wages in Barcelona relative to nominal wages in other regions
may be reduced. The transition to a closed economy causes a compression of regional wage
di¤erentials.
To test the existence of a regional wage gradient centered on Barcelona and its transfor-
mation following a change in trade regime, we specify the following reduced-form log-linear
regression equation à la Hanson (1997):
log(
wit
wct
) = o + 1  ln(xit) + 2  ln(xit) + it (5)
where i indexes geographic location, t indexes time, c indexes the open-economy industry
centre and it is an error term. Conditional on location c being the industry center, the
predictions are that (1) the regression coe¢ cients 1and 2 are negative, and (2) in the
transition to a closed economy there is a structural break in this relationship, which reduces
the e¤ect of transport costs to the industry center, j 1 j, and increases the e¤ect of transport
costs to the capital city, j 2 j, on regional relative wages.
2.2 Other sources of regional wage gradients
Other sources of regional wage di¤erentials such as the exogenous characteristics of regions,
localized human capital spillovers or government policy have been analyzed extensively.5
Among the exogenous location specic characteristics, two stand out: regional di¤erentials
in resource endowments, and exogenous amenities. Firms may be driven to locate near
natural resource concentrations. Regions endowed with minerals such as iron ore will attract
industries that make intensive use of this resource. This in turn will attract rms in footloose
5See Hanson (2001) for a good survey of sources of regional wage di¤erentials.
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industries in order to serve the market created by the agglomeration of the rst type of
industries. In these locations, rms will be able to pay higher wages to their workers. In
contrast, exogenous amenities may lead to the opposite results for wages. For instance,
workers may accept lower wages in regions endowed with good climate, beaches, and so on
(See Roback, 1982): In principle, the e¤ects of the exogenous characteristics of regions can
be incorporated into equation (5) by including xed location e¤ects in the estimation.
As for localized human capital spillovers, the prediction is that regions with larger stocks
of public knowledge will pay higher wages. (See Rauch, 1993 and Black and Henderson, 1999,
for empirical tests on this issue).
Finally, government policy may also have an e¤ect on regional wage patterns. If gov-
ernment activities concentrate in a particular region, they contribute to the creation of a
consumption mass that will bid up regional wages.
3 Trade policy and industrial location in Spain: The evidence
During the second half of the 19th century and the rst third of the 20th century, Spains
economic development, like that of most European countries, was dominated by the increase
in the share of industry in production. The particularly hard road to industrialization was
accompanied by an increasing domestic integration in markets of goods and factors that
favored the productive specialization of Spanish regions.
Though domestic market integration goes back to the 18th century, it was not until the
construction of the railway network during the second half of the 19th century that the e¤ect
of the reduction in internal transport costs led to real progress in market integration. The
process was reinforced by the integration of the capital market with the unication of the
monetary system (1869) and the expansion of the branches of the Central Bank, the Banco
de España, after the Restoration of the Monarchy in 1874.
Finally, from 1869 onwards, this context of internal market integration was accompanied
by a progressive economic openness towards neighboring countries (Tena, 1999). As Figure
1 shows, the reduction in tari¤ protection levels reached its maximum at the end of the
1880s, when Spain signed several trade treaties with its main trading partners. Further-
more, during the last decades of the 19th century, as ORourke and Williamson (1999) have
recently highlighted, a considerable reduction in international transport costs due to techno-
logical innovations in maritime and land transport led to an increasing integration of national
economies in the international markets, favoring international trade in goods and factors.
All this generated an upsurge in international trade. In fact, the rate of openness
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Figure 1: Nominal protection rates (%). Spain, 1877-1926.
Source: Tena (1999)
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( exports + importsGDP , Figure 2) reached by Spain at the beginning of the 1890s was not surpassed
until the 1970s.
In these circumstances, the distribution of regional production in Spain underwent a pro-
found transformation. In a descriptive analysis of the evolution of the geographical concen-
tration of industries in Spain in the last 150 years, Paluzie et al. (2004) show that the largest
increases in the levels of concentration are to be found during the long period between the
middle of the 19th century and the Civil War (1936-1939). In this time, the geographical con-
centration of Spanish industry, as measured by the Gini index, increased substantially both
at the aggregate level and in almost all the industrial sectors in which industrial production
can be broken down.
With regard to the geographical localization of this increasingly concentrated manufac-
turing production, the phrase used by economic historians, that is, that Catalonia became
Spains factory, is highly appropriate. In Catalonia, during the second half of the 19th cen-
7
tury, the rise in industrial production led to a considerable increase in the share of Catalan
output in overall Spanish industrial production. In 30 years, Catalonias contribution to
Spanish industrial output rose from 25% to 40% (see Tirado et al., 2002).
Among Catalan regions, it was in the area around Barcelona, the historical capital, that
most of this spectacular growth was found. Data coming from scal sources show that the
coastal province of Barcelona, which had a long history of trade and manufacture, increased
its share of Spanish industrial output from 18.56% in 1856 to 33% in 1893.6
In Tirado et al. (2002), we concluded that Barcelonas rise as the main industrial center
in Spain was linked to the existence of some initial comparative advantages which made
the Catalan city a privileged location for the industrial processes characteristic of the rst
technological revolution. These initial advantages, in the presence of scale economies, favored
the genesis of an industrial agglomeration around Barcelona on a scale much larger than that
suggested by pure endowment considerations. All this took place in a context of relative
openness.
But the last decade of the century saw an important change in terms of Spanish economy
integration in the external markets. On the one hand, in 1883, the gold convertibility of the
peseta was abandoned, thus debilitating Spains position in the international capital markets.
On the other, from 1892 on, the return to protectionism displayed in Figure 1 posed a serious
threat to external integration. The results of this new turn in the tari¤ regime were soon
noted. From 1895 onwards the rate of openness of the Spanish economy began to fall (Figure
2). In fact, these were the rst signs of what has been called the nationalistic road in
Spanish capitalism: a policy that encouraged domestic production through protectionism
and increasing public intervention to favor industrial production.
The most important expressions of this new model of development are to be found in the
interwar years. At that time, the response to the crisis of overproduction caused by Spains
neutrality in WWI was a further increase in tari¤s in order to protect Spanish industry
(Cambós tari¤, 1922) and the implementation of infrastructure projects of investment which
not only reinforced internal market integration but also increased demand for some domestic
industrial sectors (Palafox, 1992).
6The variable used to compute these percentages is the quota paid by the province of Barcelona in the tax
payments corresponding to the Contribución Industrial y de Comercio, Tarifa 3a (Industrial and Commercial
Contribution, third tari¤). In this regard, we should note that Spanish total tax payments do not include the
Basque Country and Navarre (these regions had their own scal system and were exempt from the payment of
this tax). Hence, the indicator overestimates Barcelonas share in Spanish industrial output. This is not the
case of the gures obtained in Tirado et al., 2002, calculated from estimates of Catalan and Spanish output.
However, these estimates do not allow us to distinguish between the production of Barcelona and that of
Catalonia as a whole. In any case, both indicators reect a marked increase in the importance of Barcelona
in the context of Spanish industry.
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Figure 2: Openness rates (%). Spain, 1869-1935.
Source: Serrano Sanz (1997)
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The policy change made Spain one of the most protectionist countries in the world.
According to the League of Nationsreport (1927), Spains tari¤ levels were the highest in
the world, followed at a short distance by those of the U.S. The Liepmann report (1938)
ranks Spain second in protection in 1913 (after Poland) and third in 1927 and 1931 (after
Poland and Bulgaria).
Table 1 reports Spanish protection levels in the period 1913-1931 from a comparative
perspective. Two striking features emerge from these data. First, Spains tari¤ levels were
higher than those of other Western-European countries; second, only Germany showed a
higher rate of growth in protection levels.
Table 1. Average ad-valorem tari¤s (%)
1913 1925 1931
Spain 37 44 68.5
Germany 14.3 12 37.5
France 18.8 12 29.6
Italy 21.3 17 39.3
Source. Liepmann (1938). The Liepmann report calculates nominal protection levels for 14
European countries on the basis of the tari¤s levied on a sample of 144 export commodities. Each
one of these products is important in the export structure of at least one of the considered countries.
9
In addition to these extremely high tari¤s, the importation of some intermediate goods
and raw materials was prohibited. For instance, public consumption of foreign coal was
impeded during the period 1907-1930, and private import consumption of coal was prohibited
at several times after 1922. Not surprisingly, exports and imports fell drastically during this
period and openness rates diminished considerably as a result.
What happened to location patterns after this change in trade policy? Agglomeration
e¤ects may be observed via regional di¤erences in nominal wages or via di¤erences in indus-
trial concentration. We will take a look at the regional patterns of wages and at the regional
distribution of industry.
To do this analysis we use nominal wage data for 47 Spanish provinces in 1914, 1920, 1925
and 1930 from the Estadística de Salarios y Jornadas de Trabajo published by the Ministry
of Labor and Prevision (Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión) in 1931 (henceforth, ESJT). This
source gives provincial data on hourly wages for di¤erent worker categories computed from
surveys. Data on industrial production for the years 1856, 1893, 1907, 1913 and 1929 is
obtained indirectly through scal sources: the Contribución Industrial y de Comercio, a tax
on rms prots, published in the Estadística Administrativa de la Contribución Industrial y
de Comercio and the Contribución de Utilidades, a tax on industrial corporations introduced
in 1909, made available by Betrán (1995).7
Figures 3 and 4 plot the geographical distribution of the average nominal wage for manu-
facturing non-skilled workers in 1914 and 1930. In 1914, we observe a wage gradient centered
on Barcelona in the Mediterranean axis (Catalonia, Valencia and Balearic Islands). By 1930,
the Mediterranean wage gradient has considerably weakened. We also observe growth in the
wages of other areas such as the north (Basque Country and Asturias) and the Ebro Valley
(Aragon and Navarre).
As for the geographical location of industry, some important changes start to emerge. Al-
though the geographical concentration of industries continued to rise at the aggregate level 8
, there were changes in the location of the main industrial agglomerations. Catalonias weight
in Spanish industry, aside from some exceptional situations like WWI or the rst years of the
Second Republic, reached a standstill at the end of the 19th century. As for Barcelona, its
weight in Spanish industry stabilized: in 1913, the provinces contribution to Spanish indus-
trial production was 27.63%; in 1929 it was 28.55%. Its relative growth had been remarkable
7 In the absence of alternative data, scal sources have frequently been used by economic historians as a
proxy for relative industrial output in Spanish regions.
8 In Paluzie et al. (2004) we calculated the aggregate Gini index of geographical concentration of industries.
It increased from a value of 0.68 in 1913 to 0.78 in 1929. This tendency was also veried at a higher level of
disaggregation: ve out of seven sectors increased their levels of concentration during those years.
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Figure 3: Nominal wages, non-skilled manufacturing workers, 1914
Figure 4: Nominal wages, non-skilled manufacturing workers, 1930
during the period 1856-1893, but now had come to an end. In contrast, a new group of
territories began to move forward in Spanish industrial structure: the Basque provinces of
Guipuzkoa and Biscay, Saragossa and Madrid, Spains capital city and geographical center.
(Betrán, 1999).
To obtain a more complete picture of the changes in industrial geography in the interwar
period, we construct another index of industrial location: the industrial intensity index. This
index is calculated as the ratio between the proportion of industrial activity in each territorial
unit and the proportion of total population living there.
INTENSi =
(
CiP
Ci
)
(
POPiP
POPi
)
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Figure 5: Madrids industrial production vs. Barcelonas (%)
Source: own elaboration
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where Ci is the provinces industrial production and POPi is province is total population.
Hence, an index larger than one indicates that the province is specialized in industry, i.e.,
the relative weight of industrial activity is larger than that of the population. In contrast,
an index of less than one indicates that the province is not specialized in industry.
The evolution of this index in the period 1856-1929 is interesting. First, the number of
provinces that show industrial specialization fell considerably between 1856 and 1893, from
14 to 9; with the exception of Madrid and Seville, they all belong to the coastal periphery
and 3 out of 4 Catalan provinces show industrial specialization. In 1913 there was a further
reduction in the number of provinces specialized in industry (8) but now it was the Mediter-
ranean periphery that lost importance to the benet of Madrid and the Basque Country.9
Finally, in 1929, only seven provinces were specialized in industry. The periphery continued
to decline; Barcelona was the only Catalan province still showing industrial specialization
and Saragossa, a more central territory, presented industrial specialization for the rst time.
Figure 5 plots the comparison between the industrial production of Madrid and Barcelona.
During the second half of the 19th century, Madrids
weight relative to Barcelona decreased from 22% to 15%. The tendency started to change
at the turn of the century. However, Madrids most important advance occurred in the period
9We should note that no data are available to construct the INTENS index for the Basque Country and
Navarre in 1856 and 1893.
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between WWI and the Great Depression.10
Both the pattern of regional wages and the regional shifts in industrial activity point
towards a change in the market access forces that might have favored domestic centers of con-
sumption such as Madrid and hampered locations closer to foreign markets such as Barcelona.
In the empirical analysis, we will study the changes in the relative weights of industrial cen-
tres in Spain through the analysis of regional wage gradients and of their evolution following
a trade policy change in the interwar years. The evolution of the regional wage gradient is a
reduced form estimation of the market access forces at work.
4 Empirical analysis
For the empirical analysis we use nominal wage data for 47 Spanish provinces in 1914 and 1930
from the Estadística de Salarios y Jornadas de Trabajo published by the Ministry of Labor
and Prevision (Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión) in 1931 (henceforth, ESJT). This source
gives provincial data on hourly wages for di¤erent worker categories computed from surveys.
The level of aggregation is the average province wage in 8 manufacturing industries. We
will use the wages of skilled manufacturing workers in 8 manufacturing sectors (Metallurgy,
Chemistry, Textiles, Electricity, Apparel, Wood, Transports and Furniture), 4 time points
(1914, 1920, 1925 and 1930) and a set of provinces which altogether represent 35% of Spanish
geography. From this information, we estimate the sectoral wage for the provinces for which
we do not have direct data using the existing sectoral data and the data on the average
provincial wage for skilled manufacturing workers, also given by the source. To measure
transport costs, we use the distance by railway between provincial capitals in the period
analyzed.
The functional form proposed in equation (5) will allow us to establish whether there was
a wage gradient centered in Barcelona, and its possible changes following a shift in trade
policy. 11 The regression equation for this specication is:
10Figure 5 plots Madrids relative weight compared with Barcelona in Spanish industrial output estimated
from scal sources. Data for 1856, 1893 and 1907 are constructed from the Contribución Industrial y de
Comercio, tarifa 3a. However, the data for 1913 and 1929 add a new tax, the Contribución de Utilidades, a
compulsory new tax on industrial corporations introduced in 1909 (Betrán, 1995). Given this di¤erence in the
sources used we have to be cautious in the interpretation of the evolution between 1907 and 1913. However,
what we want to analyze in our paper is the beginning of a catching-up between Madrid and Barcelona from
the end of the 19th century onwards. This tendency is maintained independently of the bond in levels caused
by the change in the source.
11Upon demand we can provide the results of the estimation of equation (6) using only direct data. The
results are not substantially di¤erent.
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log(
wijt
wcjt
) = o+1  lnDiBCN +2  lnDiMAD+ 0  f1920  lnDiBCN + 1  f1925 DiBCN (6)
+2  f1930  lnDiBCN + 0  f1920  lnDiMAD + 1  f1925  lnDiMAD
+2  f1930  lnDiMAD + !jt + 't + ijt
where wijt is the nominal wage for sector j, in region i, at time t, wcjt is the central region
(Barcelona) wage for sector j at time t, DiBCN is distance from region i to Barcelona, DiMAD
is distance from region i to Madrid, f1920, f1925 and f1930 are year dummies, !jt is a time
varying xed e¤ect for industry j, 't is the xed e¤ect for year t, and ijt is an i.i.d. term
with mean zero and variance .12
The theoretical predictions are that 1and 2 are negative and that trade reform causes
a change in the relationship between relative wages and transport costs. In particular,
Barcelonas centrality should weaken over time. To test this second prediction, we inter-
act the distance variables with time dummies so as to test for signicant changes in the
coe¢ cients from year to year.
Table (2) gives estimation results. In all regressions we verify the existence of a wage
gradient centered on the main industrial center, Barcelona. The estimated parameter of the
variableDBCN is signicant and negative. Its quantitative value indicates that a 10% increase
in the distance to Barcelona leads to a reduction in the relative nominal wage of between
0.27 and 0.33%. In column (b) we include both distance variables DBCN and DMAD. As
expected, distance to Barcelona is negative and signicant. Distance to Madrid is positive
and statistically signicant at the 1% level. The results contradict the hypothesis that relative
wages decline with distance to the capital city. However, for a majority of Spanish provinces
(all those located in the South, Centre and West of the country) being close to Madrid implies
being far from Barcelona. This fact could explain the positive sign of this coe¢ cient.
In column (c) we interact distance to Barcelona with year dummies for 1920, 1925 and
1930. The estimated parameter on the interaction terms is positive and signicant at 10%
for the last two years of the period and, moreover, it increases over time. In contrast, in
12As more than 80% of Spanish Foreign Trade was carried by sea, we also estimated this equation including
a time varying dummy for the existence of a seaport in the province. The estimated coe¢ cient was not
signicant and we chose not to include this dummy in the regression. The reason for this result is the
existence of provinces that have seaport but are far away from Barcelona, in the North-West of the Peninsula
(Galice and Asturias). The e¤ect of having a seaport is compensated by the e¤ect of being very distant from
the industrial centre.
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1920, it is not signicant. This is evidence that the e¤ect on wages of distance to Barcelona
decreased suddenly after 1922 (the year of the Cambó tari¤). Thus, we nd evidence of a
weakening in the wage gradient centered on Barcelona in that period. The estimated value
of the coe¢ cient on distance to this province is signicantly larger in 1914 than in 1925 and
1930.
In column (d) we include both distance variables and we interact them with year dummies.
Again the coe¢ cient on the interaction term that includes distance to Barcelona is positive
and signicant at the 10% level for 1925 and 1930 but the interaction term with distance
to Madrid is not signicant for any of the three years considered. We thus reject the null
hypothesis that the e¤ect of distance on wages over time has remained the same only in the
case of distance to Barcelona. There is strong evidence of a decrease in the e¤ect of distance
from Barcelona. Although not signicant, the fact that the interaction term in the case of
Madrid is negative while the coe¢ cient on distance to Madrid is positive and signicant points
toward the hypothesis of a change in the wage gradient driven by rising wages in Madrid.
Table 2. Regression results for relative nominal wages by sectors
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
lnDBCN -0.031 -0.033 -0.027 -0.030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.007)
lnDMAD 0.081 0.081
(0.000) (0.000)
lnDBCN :f1920 0.003 0.004
(0.332) (0.292)
lnDBCN :f1925 0.008 0.010
(0.091) (0.087)
lnDBCN :f1930 0.013 0.014
(0.069) (0.065)
lnDMAD:f1920 -0.006
(0.592)
lnDMAD:f1925 -0.010
(0.529)
lnDMAD:f1930 -0.012
(0.449)
Adjusted R2 0.450 0.491 0.458 0.497
N 1472 1440 1472 1440
Note.- A ll regressions include year and industry dumm ies. We do not rep ort their estim ated values. In brackets we ind icate the
level o f sign icance for which we reject the null hypothesis of a param eter equal to zero. Standard errors are estim ated by Whites
heteroskedastic ity consistent m ethod. In columns (a) and (d), we have N=1472 observations b ecause we consider 46 provinces (exclud ing
Barcelona, the province of reference), 8 sectors and 4 tim e breaks. In columns (b) and (d), we have N=1440 observations b ecause we
consider 45 provinces (exclud ing Madrid and Barcelona, the province of reference), 8 sectors and 4 tim e breaks.
15
Overall our results give stronger support than Hanson (1997) for the hypothesis of a
change in the regional wage structure following a shift in trade policy. We nd evidence that
the protectionist turn a¤ected regional relative wages over the sample period. In particular,
there was a weakening of the wage gradient centered on Barcelona.
To check the robustness of the regression results in relation to the regional xed e¤ects that
could be captured by the error term in equation (6), we reestimate equation (6) replacing
the distance variable with province dummy variables. With this regression, we want to
analyze if the distance to the economic center is one of the elements to consider among the
characteristics of each province that could explain the existence of wage di¤erentials between
them. The explanatory power of the model increases considerably (the adjusted R2 increases
to 0.794), indicating the existence of other specic characteristics of the provinces that matter
for relative wages.
So, in order to test the importance of distance in explaining these specic characteristics
of the regions, we regress the estimated province dummies on the distance vector. The results
are as follows:
!fei = 0:512  0:030: logDBCN +0:089: logDMAD (7)
(0.029) (0.041) (0.012)
R2adj = 0:584
N = 45
where !fei , is the estimated province e¤ect for province i and DBCN and DMAD are the
distance variables. In brackets we indicate the signicance level for which we reject the null
hypothesis of a parameter equal to zero. We verify that the distance variables explain a high
percentage (58.4%) of the variance in xed province e¤ects, thus suggesting that transport
costs, as measured by distance, are an important factor among the characteristics of the
provinces that explain the geographical structure of relative nominal wages.
Overall, the empirical analysis supports the hypothesis of the existence of a wage gra-
dient, centered on the province of Barcelona, explained by the existence of transport costs
to Barcelona. However, as mentioned in Section 2, other hypotheses may yield the same
prediction for regional relative wages: 1) exogenous natural resource supplies, 2) exogenous
levels of amenities, 3) human capital stocks, and 4) location bias in government policy.
For exogenous natural resource supplies to yield the same main prediction of equation
(6), i.e the existence of a gradient centered on Barcelona, it must be true that this region
concentrates natural resources. This was not the case; Barcelona lacked natural resources
such as water, minerals or coal. For the exogenous levels of amenities to yield the same
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predictions as equation (6) it must be true that they increase with distance from Barcelona
and Madrid. The evidence suggests the opposite is in fact the case. Moreover, we also believe
that amenities were not an important factor in the location decision of rms during the rst
stages of industrialization. As for human capital stocks, in particular, regional levels of
education indicate that Catalonias position was only average, and that this position did not
vary during the period considered. (Catalonias literacy rate was seventh out of 15 NUTS2
regions in Spain in both 1900 and 1930). Finally, for location bias in goverment policy to
lead to the same predictions as equation (6), it must be true that government activities were
concentrated in Barcelona or that Barcelona beneted from public subsidies. In fact, most of
government activities were concentrated in the capital city, Madrid, throughout our sample
period.
As for the hypothesis of a weakening of the wage gradient, we nd signicant evidence in
the second half of the period 1914-1930. Both the Cambó tari¤ in 1922 and the restriction on
imports of cheap coal after this date could explain the reduction of the e¤ect of distance to
Barcelona on regional wages. Although the shift in trade policy was gradual and had begun
by the end of the 19th century, the centrality of Barcelona was only clearly reduced after
these two strict measures were imposed.
However, in addition to the trade policy shift, this result could also be explained by a
comparative advantage in natural resources. In fact, these explanations are not mutually
exclusive, but complementary. On the one hand, the changes in the comparative advantage
of the regions in this period are inextricably linked to the change in trade policy. It was
the prohibition on the importing of coal and the high tari¤ protection imposed on steel
production that gave a comparative advantage to northern regions such as Asturias and the
Basque Country and disadvantaged a region, Catalonia, which lacked natural resources, and
saw its centrality reduced.
Other possible explanations for the change in the wage gradient such as changes in the
demand from abroad or changes in trade policy of the main trading partners can be ruled
out in the Spanish case. As we highlighted in Section 2, external markets were never an
important source of demand for Spanish industrial products. As for possible changes in the
trade policy of the main trading partners, the fact that Spanish exports did not fall in the
period 1913-1929 suggests that there were no relevant changes in this area.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has proved the existence of a gradient in the geographical structure of nominal
wages in Spain in the interwar period centered on the main manufacturing cluster, Barcelona.
We have also conrmed a weakening in this gradient over time. The abandonment of a
liberal trade policy at the end of the 19th century and especially during the interwar period,
weakened Barcelonas role and enhanced the relative growth of other locations.
As far as the theoretical debate is concerned, the Spanish case in the rst industrialization
wave illustrates the e¤ects of the closing of an economy to international trade, precisely the
reverse of the trade policy change recently analyzed by the literature. The new scenario
did not imply a reduction in the geographical concentration of production, as measured by
the Gini indices. However, the most important changes that occurred during this period
were in the location of the main industrial agglomerations. The new trade regime weakened
the role of the coastal region, Barcelona, which had concentrated an increasing share of
Spanish industrial output during the period of greatest opening to foreign trade; we thus
provide support for Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2004)s hypothesis on the e¤ects of trade
policy changes when one of the regions has a pronounced advantage in access to international
markets. The evidence we found of a structural break in the relationship between distance
and relative wages after trade reform is stronger than Hanson (1997).
In addition, this paper brings new insights into Madrids rise as an important industrial
center on Spain. Historians have pointed to some irrefutable facts, such as its status as
the capital-city and the main communications hub. Yet they have not been able to explain
why the relative rise of Madrid began precisely at the turn of the century, and not before
or afterwards. In this article we have suggested a possible explanation, though as yet the
evidence found is not conclusive. The progressive closing of the Spanish economy tended to
weaken the privileged position of the coastal regions and favor the rise of the central regions.
If we consider this change in the trade policy regime, we can explain the precise chronology
of Madrids relative rise.
In future research, we aim to test our hypothesis further, by analyzing the recent
experience of a trade liberalization reform in Spain in the second half of the 20th century.
If the theoretical predictions that we tested in this paper still hold, Barcelonas centrality
should be re-established.
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A Appendix. Descriptive analysis of wage data
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of wages
1914 1920 1925 1930
Metallurgy Mean 0.504 0.956 1.085 1.125
Std. Dev. 0.055 0.206 0.182 0.158
Chemistry Mean 0.440 0.812 0.946 0.979
Std. Dev. 0.094 0.205 0.194 0.190
Textiles Mean 0.450 0.762 0.895 0.893
Std. Dev. 0.125 0.170 0.184 0.183
Electricity Mean 0.451 0.868 1.025 1.085
Std. Dev. 0.077 0.193 0.210 0.193
Apparel Mean 0.442 0.809 0.937 0.969
Std. Dev. 0.070 0.194 0.161 0.152
Wood Mean 0.520 1.003 1.122 1.084
Std. Dev. 0.085 0.262 0.169 0.208
Transports Mean 0.537 0.965 1.099 1.083
Std. Dev. 0.069 0.246 0.142 0.199
Furniture Mean 0.517 1.002 1.145 1.141
Std. Dev. 0.115 0.144 0.183 0.176
INDUSTRY Mean 0.437 0.769 0.927 0.937
Std. Dev. 0.056 0.153 0.146 0.140
Source: ESJT
Note: the unit of measure is pesetas/hour. Data by sectors come from the wages of skilled workers, while
average data (industry) are from the wages of non-skilled workers.
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